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1 Introduction 
 
In the pre-dawn darkness of 15 October 2007, dozens of police from the 
Armed Offenders’ Squad and secret Special Tactics Group conducted 
simultaneous raids across New Zealand.  They announced to a startled country 
that the raids were authorized by warrants issued under the Arms Act 1983 
and the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, and that they had broken a network 
of terrorist training camps centred in the remote Urewera mountains in the 
centre of the North Island.  The seventeen people arrested were not, however, 
members of an Al-Quaeda sleeper cell.  They were all local political activists.  
Some had high public profiles.  Many were Maori nationalists.  The raids drew 
widespread public condemnation.  They were decried as racist political 
harassment and evidence of the dangers inherent in the anti-terrorism 
legislation introduced at the behest of the United States in the wake of the 
airliner attacks of 11 September 2001.   
 
Although the Police had briefed the high-level Officials Committee for 
Domestic and External Security before the raids, they still required the 
approval of the Attorney-General in order to prosecute anybody under the 
Terrorism Suppression Act1.  When they sought that approval for those 
arrested during the October 2007 raids, the Solicitor-General announced that, 
                                                
1  Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. S67. 
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on the basis of the evidence that had been gathered, he could not assent to the 
charges, and he went on to describe the existing law as ‘unworkable’.   
 
In response to this situation, the Government gave the New Zealand Law 
Commission the task of examining the crux of the matter: whether existing 
law needed to be amended ‘to cover the conduct of individuals that creates 
risk to, or public concern about, the preservation of public safety and security 
and the means of obtaining evidence in relation to that conduct’.  It also 
specified that the Law Commission must take account of the ‘the need to 
ensure an appropriate balance between the preservation of public safety and 
security and the maintenance of individual rights and freedoms’.   
 
This is an opportune time and the Law Commission the ideal agency to 
conduct this exercise, named the Public Safety and Security Project.  This 
paper was prepared as a contribution to this project.  It traverses some of the 
key theoretical and practical issues that might underlie the matters under 
consideration, and identifies challenges and opportunities that present 
themselves.   
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the definitional difficulty associated 
with the notion of terrorism, and the political history of attempts to resolve 
this problem.  It then considers the New Zealand’s past experience in 
assessing and managing national security.  The next section deals with the 
tensions that have emerged between anti-terrorism legislation and the criminal 
law, including a discussion of how such tensions might be resolved; whether, 
for example, the solution is to adjust the criminal law so as to better equip it to 
deal with the challenge of terrorism, or to maintain a divide between anti-
terrorist legislation and criminal law.  In the final section, I scrutinise the 
‘balancing’ approach that the Law Commission has been set, noting that some 
serious criticisms have been raised about models that seek to balance national 
security considerations on one hand and individual freedoms on the other. 
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I conclude by identifying a number of ways in which the Law Commission 
might learn both from the experience of New Zealand and other countries in 
combating terrorism, and from the extensive body of academic scholarship in 
this area.  I also raise the possibility of whether New Zealand’s special 
position may enable it to develop anti-terrorism legislation with an orientation 
as independent as its anti-nuclear policies.  In doing so, New Zealand may be 
able to respond to the threat of terrorism no less effectively than any other 
country, but without having to compromise basic freedoms and the rule of 
law.  I argue that, to the extent that there are such fundamental compromises 
made, they should occur only with the informed consent of the public. 
 
 
2 Defining and Making War on Terrorism 
 
Nine days after the attacks of September 11, US President George W Bush 
declared a ‘war on terror’.  In a speech to the Joint Session of Congress he 
characterised it in these terms: 
 
‘Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated 
strikes.  Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy 
campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen… We will starve 
terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from 
place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest.  And we will pursue 
nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.  Every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make.  Either you are with us or 
you are with the terrorists.  From this day forward, any nation that 
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
States as a hostile regime’2. 
 
Given the close attention it has attracted, it is remarkable that terrorism has 
proved such a difficult concept to define with precision.  This difficulty can be 
                                                
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.  Retrieved on 2 July 2008. 
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illustrated by the fact that it remains undefined even in the most important 
current international anti-terrorism resolution, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (which was passed just 17 days after the September 11 
attacks).  Lord Carlile, who was commissioned to produce a report for the 
British Parliament in 2007 entitled ‘The Definition of Terrorism’, found a 
wide range of ways that various national jurisdictions and international 
conventions and resolutions have dealt with the topic, and noted that ‘there is 
no universally accepted definition of terrorism’3.  Moreover, he concluded, 
having read many attempts at defining the concept, ‘there is (not) one that I 
could read as the paradigm’4. 
 
The term ‘terrorism’ was first used at the time of the French Revolution to 
describe the system of terror administered by the Jacobins5.  It was later 
broadened from being exclusively used in relation to state-instigated terror as 
a means of controlling its own population to also include, as its modern 
application does, ‘acts of violence by private citizens intended to intimidate 
other citizens, groups or states’6.  The definitional difficulties stem from the 
problem of characterising as terrorism all acts of politically-motivated 
violence that generate fear and anxiety.  Such a simplistic definition would 
apply the ‘terrorist’ label, in a way many would consider inappropriate, to 
partisans of occupied Europe during World War Two and, more recently, 
national liberation movements asserting their legitimate right to self-
determination against belligerent states.   
 
This has given rise to what Stephens refers to as ‘the ongoing difficulty in a 
satisfactory demarcation between terrorism and the violence that continues to 
be used in aid of what many states consider to be legitimate political 
                                                
3 Lord Carlile of Berriew. The Definition of Terrorism. London: Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, March 2007, p.3. 
4  Ibid., p.4. 
5  G Guillaume. ‘Terrorism and International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
Volume 53, 2004, p.537. 
6  T. Stephens. ‘International Criminal Law and the Response to International Terrorism’, University of 
New South Wales Law Review, Volume 27, number 2, 2004, p.457. 
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struggle’7.  Buchanan has argued that this problem can be satisfactorily 
addressed only by a moral theory of international law which could generate a 
clearer concept of state legitimacy against which self-determination could be 
measured8.  It is the absence of agreement on such a measure that has 
prevented the emergence of a more principled and less pragmatic and 
politicised international approach to combating terrorism.  Sorel notes that the 
international community has attempted to sidestep the political sensitivity of 
definitions and has instead adapted itself to the ‘predominant form of terrorist 
action at any given time’9. 
 
There is currently an exceptionally high degree of agreement among states in 
relation to the anti-terrorist measures that have been developed to counter the 
terrorist threat posed by Muslim fundamentalists.  This is demonstrated by the 
consensus support of all 192 UN member states for the UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy that was established in 200610.  To some extent, however, 
this is simply an indication of the extent to which Al-Quaeda and its affiliates 
are marginalised in the international community.  During the Cold War, by 
contrast, almost every group that might be a candidate for the ‘terrorist’ 
designation enjoyed a degree of support, understanding or tolerance from a 
significant world power.   
 
Besides the early and unsuccessful attempt by the League of Nations to 
establish the ‘Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism’ in 
193711, the international community first started to seriously address the issue 
of terrorism in response to the increase in aircraft hijacking in the 1960s.  The 
UN committee that was established to find ways to eliminate international 
terrorism and study its underlying causes was unable to find an agreed means 
                                                
7  Ibid., p.458. 
8  A. Buchanan. Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.11. 
9  J-M Sorel. ‘Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight against its Financing’, 
European Journal of International Law. Volume 14, 203, p.368. 
10  The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. UN Doc A/Res/60/288 
11  Reported in J. Dugard. ‘Towards the Definition of International Terrorism’, American Society of 
International Law Proceedings. Volume 67, 1973, p.95. 
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for distinguishing terrorism from legitimate struggles for national liberation12.  
However, in the wake of the 1985 seizure of the ship, the Achille Lauro, the 
UN reached its first agreement on unequivocal condemnation of the use of 
terror tactics, regardless of the objectives that were being advanced13.  This 
position was restated forcefully in 2005 through UN Security Council 
Resolution 1624 which condemned all terrorist acts ‘irrespective of their 
motivation, whenever and by whomever committed’14. 
 
The international community has, therefore, not allowed its inability to 
establish an agreed definition of terrorism to prevent it from developing 
mechanisms for combating terrorism. Many national jurisdictions have done 
the same.  Most have side-stepped definitional challenges by focusing instead 
on defining terrorist acts.  From these definitions are derived, in turn, methods 
for defining ‘terrorist entities’.  Typically, as is the case in New Zealand, an 
entity is defined and can then be subsequently legally ‘designated’ as terrorist 
if it ‘has knowingly carried out, or has knowingly participated in the carrying 
out of one or more terrorist act’15.  
 
Golder and Williams usefully describe the definitional approach as the 
‘general or deductive model,’ and contrast it with the internationally preferred 
approach of focusing on terrorist acts which they call the ‘specific or inductive 
model’16.  However, the inductive model is not entirely unproblematic either.  
Golder and Williams note that it ‘results in a piecemeal, ad hoc and reactive 
means of regulation’ and lacks the wider moral and political appeal of the 
general approach ‘which can lead to a stronger statement about the 
                                                
12  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism. UN Doc A/34/37 (1979) 
13  M. Halberstam. ‘The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: From Exempting 
National Liberation Movements to Criminalising Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever Committed’, 
Colombia Journal of Transnational Law.  Volume 41, 2003. 
14  UN Doc S/Res/1624 (2005) 
15  Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) Section 20 (1) and Section 22 (1). 
16  B. Golder and G. Williams. ‘What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition’, University of New 
South Wales Law Journal. Volume 27, number 2, 2004, p.273. 
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indiscriminate use of violence to attain political, religious or ideological 
ends’17. 
 
A key feature of the inductive model is that it confronts practical problems in 
relation to specific acts.  Some acts, for example ones that deliberately aim to 
maximise human deaths, can be relatively uncontroversially categorised as 
terrorist acts.  There is, however, less unanimity when it comes to harm that is 
less serious than death or when small numbers of victims are involved18.  And 
when it comes to acts that involve harm only to property, there is considerable 
debate over applying the terrorist label.  In the New Zealand Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002, ‘serious damage to property of great value or 
significance’19 is sufficient, but only if it is likely to result in ‘the death of, or 
other serious bodily injury to, one or more persons (other than the person 
carrying out the act)’20 or ‘a serious risk to the health or safety of a 
population’21 or ‘serious interference with or serious disruption to an 
infrastructure facility, if likely to endanger human life’22.   
 
Critics such as the Green Party and Greenpeace have expressed concern that 
the threshold for criminally endangering of human life in this legislation 
should be that it was not only likely, but also intended.  As the Green Party’s 
Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Keith Locke, told Parliament: 
 
‘… those organising a hospital strike or a disruptive protest on the 
scale of the 1981 Springbok Tour demonstrations could be up for a life 
sentence for serious disruption of an infrastructure facility, in a way 
                                                
17  Ibid., p.294. 
18  For example, the Carlile Report notes (at p.16) that there are differences over whether to include as 
a terrorist act, the poisoning of a water supply with intent to cause sickness but not death.  
19  Section 5 (3) c 
20  Section 5 (3) a. 
21  Section 5 (3) b. 
22  Section 5 (3) d. 
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likely to endanger human life, even if they in no way intended to 
endanger human life’23. 
 
 
3 Terrorism in New Zealand: Real Risk or Global Responsibility? 
 
New Zealand’s legislative response to terrorism originated in part as a 
response to the Rainbow Warrior bombing, with the International Terrorism 
(Emergency Powers) Act 1987, which confers emergency powers on the 
police and armed forces in the event of a declaration of an ‘international 
terrorist emergency’.  At the time of the September 11 attacks, New Zealand 
had passed legislation to implement eight of the major international 
conventions on terrorism and was seeking to implement two more through the 
Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill 200124.  Because this Bill was being 
debated in Parliament at the time, it became a ‘convenient vehicle’ to respond 
to the obligations New Zealand assumed in the wake of UN Security Council 
Resolution 137325. 
 
For most Western industrialised states comparable to New Zealand, there is no 
shortage of terrorism ‘experts’, politicians, civil society leaders and academics 
who are prepared to publicly declare that there is not only a significant risk of 
a terrorist attack but also that such attacks are inevitable.  Echoing comments 
from United States Vice-President Cheney that it was not ‘if’ but ‘when’ 
terrorists would strike again at the US, the top security official of the US 
Senate, William Pickle, declared that a terrorist attack on the Capitol was 
inevitable and probably could not be prevented.26  In the United Kingdom, Sir 
John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, has said, ‘As the Prime 
Minister and the Home Secretary have said, there is perhaps an inevitability 
                                                
23  http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/1/0/f/48HansD_20071024_00000891-
Terrorism-Suppression-Amendment-Bill-Second.htm  Retrieved 3 July 2008. 
24  A Conte. ‘A Clash of Wills: Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights’ New Zealand Universities Law 
Review. Volume 20, 2003. 
25  M. Palmer. ‘Counter Terrorism Law’ New Zealand Law Journal. 2002, p.456. 
26  The Examiner. 22 November 2006. 
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that some attack will get through’.27  Similarly, the FBI’s Executive Assistant 
Director of Counter-Terrorism, John Pistole, has said that ‘an attack on 
Australia is likely inevitable’28.  His remarks were made in support of the 
assessment of the Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Mick Keelty, that 
Australia’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq put it at greater risk of terrorist 
attack.   
 
It is noteworthy, therefore, that the terrorist threat to New Zealand is 
downplayed.  Whether it is because of New Zealand’s geographical isolation, 
its reluctance since 1999 to participate in US military forays, or some other 
factors, there has been no credible assertion that a terrorist attack on New 
Zealand is likely, let alone imminent.  This is recognised even by those who 
might be said to have an incentive to exaggerate the terrorist risk to the 
country.  The New Zealand Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism, Dell Higgie, 
has acknowledged, that ‘the threat of a direct attack against New Zealand 
remains low’29.  And the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) 
reports that it “continues to believe that the risk of a terrorist attack on New 
Zealand or New Zealand interests is low (‘terrorist attack is assessed as 
possible, but is not expected’)”30. New Zealanders were among the fatalities in 
September 11 attacks, the London bombings and the Bali bombings.  
However, there is no evidence that New Zealanders abroad perceived 
themselves any more at risk from terrorist attack than from other extraordinary 
calamities such as plane crashes and natural disasters.  
 
The infrequency of domestic security incidents in New Zealand poses 
problems for those charged with managing the risk they pose to society.  As 
the Controller and Auditor-General states in his report on managing threats to 
domestic security: 
                                                
27  The Guardian. 17 March 2004. 
28  Sydney Morning Herald.  16 March 2004. 
29  Dell Higgie. “Whole of Government Approach and New Zealand’s Contribution to Combating 
International Terrorism’. 15 August 2005. www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/ 
Retrieved 30/6/08 
30  New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. Report to the House of Representatives for the year 
ended 30 June 2006. Wellington. 
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The infrequency of domestic security incidents can also make it 
difficult to maintain public support.  This is especially the case when 
initiatives to deter threats are likely to impinge on business interests or 
the freedoms people enjoy… The greater the length of time between 
security incidents, the greater the likelihood of reduced public 
consciousness of the threat, and the more likely people will be to 
perceive precautions as excessive’31. 
 
Over the last 25 years, the two incidents that would most clearly qualify as 
terrorist attacks in New Zealand were directed against what might be broadly 
categorised as social justice groups in civil society.  One was entirely 
domestic: during a period of government-encouraged hostility to trade unions 
in 1983, a bomb was detonated in Wellington Trades Hall, killing the 
caretaker, Ernie Abbot.  The other was largely international: in 1985 a 
Portuguese photographer, Fernando Pereira, died after agents of the French 
Government’s foreign intelligence agency, la Direction Générale de la 
Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), blew-up the Greenpeace flagship, Rainbow 
Warrior, in Auckland harbour as it prepared a protest voyage to the French 
nuclear testing site in Moruroa Atoll.   
 
As New Zealand is a low-risk country, the justification for introducing special 
anti-terrorism laws into it since 2001 has been principally defined in global 
terms as an acceptance that ‘the threat of international terrorism can be 
effectively addressed only through concerted and co-ordinated international 
efforts that not only target terrorists themselves, but terrorism funding, support 
and infrastructure’32.   Declaring that the September 11 attacks confirmed that 
terrorism is ‘an international phenomenon’ and that ‘terrorists consider the 
world their stage’, the NZSIS claims that there are people and groups in New 
Zealand ‘with links to overseas organizations that are committed to acts of 
                                                
31 Controller and Auditor-General. Managing Threats to Domestic Security. Wellington: Controller and 
Auditor-General. October, 2003. 
32  Higgie. Op cit. 
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terrorism, violence and intimidation’ and warns of ‘the risk that individuals or 
groups may use New Zealand as a safe haven from which to plan or facilitate 
terrorist attacks elsewhere’33. 
 
The origins of international criminal law lie centuries ago in attempts by 
countries to deal with the global scourge of piracy by agreeing that any 
country could prosecute pirates whether or not they had transgressed a 
domestic law.  Today, there is a widely held view that terrorism also needs to 
be combated by means of a co-ordinated globalised response.  At a global 
level, this response can be found in UN Security Council Resolution 1373 as 
well as a series of other anti-terrorist conventions involving aircraft, ships, 
persons and the use of particular materials.   
 
This global strategic perspective can also be found in the interpretation and 
application of law, as demonstrated by the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
deportation case of Suresh34.  The Court declared that since 2001 it has no 
longer been valid ‘to suggest that terrorism in one country did not necessarily 
implicate other countries’ and went on to conclude that: 
 
‘… to insist on direct proof of a specific threat to Canada as the test for 
“danger to the security of Canada” is to set the bar too high.  There 
must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada.  But 
the threat need not be direct; rather it may be grounded in distant 
events that indirectly have a real possibility of harming Canadian 
security’. 
 
In previous periods when national security is perceived to have been under 
grave threat, the judiciary has given differing views on how national security 
and individual freedoms should be reconciled.  During the sustained IRA 
bombing campaign of the 1970s, for example, Lord Denning declared national 
                                                
33  New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. The Work of the Service. NZSIS: Wellington, 2003. 
34  Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] SCJ No.3 [2002] 1 SCR 3. 
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security to be of greater importance than individual freedoms, saying ‘great as 
is the public interest in the freedom of the individual and the doing of justice 
to him, nevertheless in the last resort it must take second place to the security 
of the country itself’.35 
 
Further, referring to a 1973 judgment of Lord Reid, Lord Denning maintained 
that ‘when the national security is at stake even the rules of natural justice may 
have to be modified to meet the position’.36  This stands in contrast to the 
famous declaration of Lord Atkin (in a minority opinion) during World War 
Two: 
 
‘Amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent.  They may be changed 
but they speak the same language in war as in peace.  It has always 
been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for 
which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no 
respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any attempted 
encroachments on his liberty by executive, alert to see that any 
coercive action is justified in law’37. 
 
However conceptually or strategically attractive the argument about New 
Zealand’s global responsibility may be in the current response to terrorism, it 
is eerily similar to the intelligence and security discourse of the Cold War.  
The enemy during the decades of the Cold War was communism: it was a 
phenomenon depicted as a system and a way of life that was anathema to our 
own, which had global designs for imposing itself on the world, possessed the 
capacity to destroy us (and indeed the entire planet), and was sufficiently 
callous and untrustworthy for us to be in no doubt that it could well do so.  If 
the suicide bomber could be the person next to us on the bus, the reds could 
have been at home under our beds. 
 
                                                
35 R v Lewes Justices, Ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department, [1973] AC 388 at 402. 
36 R v Lewes Justices, Ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department, [1973] AC 388 at 460. 
37  Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 244. 
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Again, for New Zealand, the red peril was a proxy threat.  The one celebrated 
case of a New Zealand citizen and resident who was an allegedly active spy 
was William Sutch, a senior civil servant who was thought by the NZSIS to be 
a Soviet spy and was unsuccessfully prosecuted in 1975 for breaching the 
Official Secrets Act.  In 2008, previously confidential files were declassified 
and confirmed for the first time that he was not a spy, and that the NZSIS had 
deliberately misled the Prime Minister of the day and conducted unlawful 
surveillance of Mr Sutch.  The released documents include a 1976 report by 
the Chief Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, who described aspects of the case as 
‘disturbing’ and concluded in relation to the NZSIS raid of Mr Sutch that ‘In 
August 1974, the service has no legal authority (to do this)’ and that ‘they 
chose to break the law’38.   
 
Convinced of the argument that in the fight against communism, the free 
world was only as strong as its weakest link, successive governments ensured 
that New Zealand played its part.  In the latter stages of the Cold War, when 
the Labour Government of David Lange took the bold step of refusing to 
allow nuclear vessels to enter New Zealand ports, the country was castigated 
and ostracised by the US and some of her allies. 
 
In the UK, some of the early erosion of the rule of law39 began in 1974 with 
Labour’s Prevention of Terrorism legislation in the wake of the Birmingham 
bombing: it was introduced supposedly as a ‘strictly temporary measure’ but it 
was never repealed40.  In Canada, it was the War Measures Act of 1970 in 
response to the murder of Pierre Laporte, although this has been superseded by 
the constitutional filter of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms41.  
Before 2001, New Zealand had not been confronted by the kind of threat that 
                                                
38  New Zealand Herald. 6 June 2008. 
39  Police were given powers such as internment without trial, excluding British subjects from the 
British mainland, questioning suspects for up to four days without access to lawyers, and spying on 
whole communities. 
40 H. Kennedy. Just Law. London: Chatto and Windus, 2004, p.31. 
41 I. Cotler. ‘Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and 
Policy’ in R.J. Daniels, P Macklem and K Roach (editors) The Security of Freedom: Essays on 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, p.113. 
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would generate public acceptance of (let alone a public clamour for) the 
introduction of laws that would significantly compromise basic freedoms42.  
This combination of circumstances places New Zealand in an interesting 
position in relation to the view that anti-terrorist legislation can only be 
effective if it is globally watertight.   
 
It could well be the case that New Zealanders believe that they can retain more 
basic freedoms than other countries in the context of the ‘war on terror’ 
without significantly compromising their own security.  Were New Zealand to 
adopt such a position, it is also possible that the consequences for other 
countries as well as for New Zealand itself may be no less devastating than 
was the impact of New Zealand’s resignation from the US nuclear deterrence 
camp.  Given the potential compromises that may be made to the basic 
freedoms and human rights of New Zealanders in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’, this hypothesis merits if not actual testing, at the very least a thorough 
exploration. 
 
 
4 Terrorism and Criminal Law 
 
A key issue for considering the challenges inherent in legislating against 
terrorism is to ask whether the criminal law is sufficient to deal with the 
contemporary threat of terrorism.  There are no fewer than three important 
dimensions to concerns that have been expressed about the impact of anti-
terrorism legislation on criminal law: the impact on status offences, issues 
surrounding inchoate offences, and the criminalisation of politics. 
 
4.1 Nulla Poena 
 
                                                
42  The overwhelming public support for a referendum in 2000 calling for harsher penalties for violent 
criminals was not associated with any call for a change to the legal rights of those accused of crimes. 
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The first of these relates to the long-standing legal principle of nulla poena 
sine lege, that there should be no punishment without law.  As Allen 
remarked, ‘The nulla poena concept assumes that persons become criminals 
because of their acts, not simply because of who they are43’.  McSherry cites 
Section 102.1 of Australia’s Criminal Code that imposes sentences of up to ten 
years imprisonment for membership of a terrorist organization where 
‘member’ includes being an ‘informal member of the organization’ and one 
‘who has taken steps to become a member of the organization’.  In a similar 
vein, she notes that Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004 introduces a 
maximum three-year term of imprisonment for meeting or communicating 
with people involved in a terrorist group on two or more occasions.  McSherry 
argues that to punish people because of those with whom they associate, rather 
than for what they have done ‘raises the spectre of the future enactment of 
other indictable status offences which will continue to seriously erode the 
principle of legality as it relates to the criminal law’44. 
 
In 1990, Gearty noted that the value to a wide range of political regimes of 
applying the terrorist label to their opponents, saw an expansionary manoeuvre 
in which: 
 
‘… all the activities of the groups engaged in acts of terror are 
automatically classed as terrorist, even when many of those activities, 
such as fundraising and political campaigning, are conducted in a 
peaceful manner.  In extreme cases those who merely share the 
political goals of subversive groups may find themselves described as 
terrorists’45. 
 
Such instances are now less extreme, although New Zealand law does not go 
as far in this as Australia and contains no offence of mere association with 
                                                
43  F Allen. The Habits of Legality: Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996, p.15. 
44 B McSherry. ‘Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code: Broadening the Boundaries of Australian 
Criminal Laws’ University of New South Wales Law Journal, Volume 27, Number 2, 2004, p. 366. 
45  C. Gearty. Terror. London: Faber and Faber, 1990, p.3. Emphasis added. 
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terrorists.  The Terrorism Suppression Act deals with recruitment to terrorist 
groups, harbouring or concealing terrorists, and participation in terrorist 
groups46.  The strongest protection against the encroachment identified by 
McSherry is found in relation to participation in terrorist groups which 
becomes an offence only where the purpose of the participation is to enhance a 
group’s ‘ability … to carry out, or to participate in the carrying out of, one or 
more terrorist acts’47.  The law relating to harbouring or concealing terrorists 
is also less invasive.  It criminalises only that assistance that is offered to a 
particular person who is or should be (the threshold is recklessness, not direct 
knowledge) known to have carried out or be intending to carry out a terrorist 
act.  It does not apply to assisting any member of a terrorist group.   
 
Each of these provisions is compromised by the problems identified above in 
relation to the breadth of what might constitute a terrorist act in the current 
legislation.  Besides this, however, the danger McSherry identifies exists most 
keenly in the way recruitment is dealt with in Section 12.  Here, a person is 
liable to imprisonment for up to 14 years for recruiting somebody into a group 
which that person knows ‘carries out or participates in the carrying out of one 
or more terrorist acts’.  One impact of this provision is that a close and 
controversial ruling that a single action of a group had crossed the line 
sufficiently to be classified as a terrorist act could have a far-reaching impact.  
Such a ruling could easily be made against radical social groups that embraced 
and were prepared to bear the personal risk of engaging in non-lawful activity.  
It could also conceivably ensnare a mainstream and normally law-abiding 
environmental, animal welfare or overseas aid organisation.  Such a ruling 
would leave anybody who recruited another person into the affected group 
exposed to a severe punishment for what may have been at the time a very 
innocuous act carried out in a genuine spirit of social concern of the kind that 
most would agree should be encouraged or at least tolerated in society.  As 
such, in addition to the undesirable effect of repressing basic freedoms of 
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political expression, it would also appear to be an example of New Zealand 
legislation sitting quite uneasily with the nulla poena principle. 
 
 
4.2 Inchoate Offences and Preventative Policing 
 
A second way in which anti-terrorist measures affect criminal law in an 
undesirable way is the effect they have on inchoate offences and, more 
broadly, the direction in which they encourage policies of preventative 
policing to develop.  Roach has made the point that, even in the absence of 
special anti-terrorist legislation, ‘what the September 11 terrorists did was a 
crime long before they boarded the doomed aircraft’48.  It is a serious criminal 
offence in probably every country, and certainly in New Zealand, to conspire 
and/or attempt to carry out such a heinous act.   
 
Conspiracy, attempt and incitement are among the inchoate offences in that 
they criminalize conduct which has the potential to culminate in an offence 
without the requirement that the offence be actually committed49.  The 
rationale for such offences is that if some conduct is sufficiently harmful to be 
criminalized, so too should an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to bring that 
about.  Inchoate offences empower police to prevent crime and still prosecute 
the potential perpetrator.  However, inchoate offences pose a significant 
challenge to the police and the courts: how to ‘determine when an act is 
sufficiently close to the intended offence to constitute a real danger to the 
public and justify intervention’50.  The dividing line for an attempt is often 
expressed as the point where actions move beyond mere preparation, but it has 
proved notoriously difficult both conceptually and in practice, to define what 
this means.  If the threshold is set too high, public safety is compromised by 
having dangerous criminals avoid liability; if it is set too low, people risk 
                                                
48 K. Roach. ‘The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law’ in R.J. Daniels, P Macklem and K 
Roach (editors) The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002, p.151. 
49 P. Gillies. Criminal Law. Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1985, p.512. 
50 A.P. Simester and W.J Brookbanks. Principles of Criminal Law. Wellington: Brookers, 2002, p.233. 
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being criminalized for conduct that is not much more than unexecuted 
thoughts51.   
 
Roach has pointed out that the difficulties inherent in inchoate offences are 
compounded in anti-terrorism legislation that explicitly criminalizes certain 
inchoate offences like attempts, conspiracies, threats and incitement.  Noting 
the dangers of legal ‘monstrosities such as attempting attempts’, he warns that 
‘the reference to inchoate forms of terrorist activities in crimes that are 
themselves inchoate expands the net of criminal liability in unforeseen, 
complex and undesirable ways’52.  
 
Although inchoate offences authorise police intervention in advance of the 
substantive crime being committed, the traditional role of the police remains 
more reactive than proactive.  That is, unless there is a reasonably high degree 
of certainty that a particular crime has been, is being or will be committed by a 
particular person, the coercive powers of the state for search, seizure or arrest 
should not be used.  Cohen notes that the state’s concern with preventing 
criminality is ‘supposed to be met with event-specific investigation rather than 
panoptic supervision’ and that the police are expected to confine their 
investigations to real and not hypothetical crimes and ‘do not possess the 
power to conduct a wholesale inquisition into society’53.  It may be possible to 
endorse the principle of crime prevention without sanctioning the growth of 
extraordinary, before-the-fact, preventative police powers54, and also to 
effectively prevent terrorism without affording extraordinary powers to 
intelligence agencies.   
 
Friedland has argued that, when it comes to serious threats to national 
security, judicially authorized wiretapping should be ‘at or near the top of the 
                                                
51  Ibid., p.238. 
52  Roach., Op Cit., p.160. 
53  S.A. Cohen. Privacy, Crime and Terror. Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril. Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2006, p. 56. 
54  S.A. Cohen, ‘Safeguards in and Justification for Canada’s New Anti-Terrorism Act’, National 
Journal of Constitutional Law. Volume 14, 2003, p..9. 
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list of techniques that could be used’55.  While this appears reasonable, it is 
fast becoming a far more invasive measure than it previously was, even in the 
quite recent past.  It has become so because of the rapid and radical 
digitisation of a diverse variety of forms of communication in recent years.  
Email correspondence, blogs, social networking sites and SMS text messaging 
represent new forms of communication that have significantly increased the 
use of the written word in both personal and professional communication.  In 
fact, much of this communication is so instant and non-reflective that it now 
commits to writing expressions, reactions, idea and thoughts that would 
previously have never become written documents and would, rather, have 
constituted little more than thinking out loud.  Their digitisation gives them a 
degree of permanence and authority that does not so easily attach to the 
spoken word. 
 
At the same time, the electronic footprints generated by, for example, 
‘cookies’ embedded within web browsers, the replacement of cash in favour 
of electronic transactions for commercial exchanges, and the routinisation of 
both visible and clandestine digital security cameras in the public and private 
sphere create unprecedented possibilities for the construction of intricate 
profiles of people’s personal lives.  Moreover, it has become routine practice 
for computer equipment, cell phones and other digital devices to be seized and 
subjected to forensic examination as part of police investigations. 
 
One common feature of all of these technological developments is that they 
lend themselves to interception, storage and analysis.  This has the effect of 
enhancing to an extraordinary degree the capacity of intelligence agencies to 
‘conduct a wholesale investigation into society’56 even without any legislative 
change.  
 
                                                
55 M.L. Friedland. ‘Police Powers in Bill C-36’ in R.J. Daniels, P Macklem and K Roach (editors) The 
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002, p. 274. 
56  Cohen, 2006. Op. cit., p.56. 
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In a successful trespass action against the NZSIS, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that, for a state agency to physically and covertly enter a person’s home was 
such an intrusion that it could only exist where it is specifically authorized by 
statute; it could not be inferred as an inherent part of, for example, placing or 
retrieving a surveillance device57.  In the 1999 judgment, the court used the 
ancient expression of a person’s home being her castle.  An argument might 
now be advanced that that castle has been digitised. 
 
Borovoy, while recognising the apparent good sense in a strategy of 
preventative intelligence, issued a warning in 1989 about ‘the most groundless 
anticipatory speculation’ being encouraged by a broadly preventative mandate.  
‘When the goal is prevention’, he argues, ‘the idea is to amass enough 
intelligence to make reliable predictions. There would be a tendency to intrude 
very pervasively on investigative targets in order to learn as much as possible 
about their habits beliefs, associations and predilections.  It is not hard to 
appreciate the potentially chilling impact of such an approach on the rights of 
privacy and dissent’58.   
 
 
4.3 Criminalising Motive and Politics 
 
The third fundamental difficulty in the relationship between anti-terrorist 
legislation and criminal law relates to the inherently political, religious or 
ideological dimensions of ‘terrorist’ acts.  Some anti-terrorist legislation, such 
as in France, refers to disturbing public order by intimidation or terror in terms 
which Lord Carlile considers broad enough to include ‘a serious idiosyncratic 
criminal’59.  However, most post-2001 anti-terrorism legislation, including 
that of New Zealand, makes it a necessary condition of terrorism for an act to 
be ‘carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political or 
                                                
57   Choudry v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 582 (CA) 
58 A Borovoy. ‘Terrorism, Security and the Surveillance Powers of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
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religious cause, and with the following intention: to induce terror in a civilian 
population; or to unduly compel or to force a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act’60.  There are significant 
difficulties associated with this approach. 
 
Problems could be encountered both in relation to individuals within 
ideological groups acting with purely criminal intent, and where individuals 
within criminal groups have quasi-ideological motives.  On one hand there 
may be uncertainty in some circumstances of what might constitute a political, 
religious or ideological objective and how to prove this beyond reasonable 
doubt.  For example, hatred of the police, which appeared to have been an 
important factor in the bombing of the Sydenham Police Station by a 
Christchurch criminal gang in the 1990s, could also be argued to have a 
political dimension.  On the other hand, as Lord Diplock noted in his report on 
how to deal with terrorist activity in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, there is the 
issue that terrorist organizations ‘inevitably attract into their ranks ordinary 
criminals whose motivation for particular acts may be private gain or personal 
revenge’61.  
 
These matters compound the challenge the courts already face in determining 
intention.  As Kirby J stated, ‘absent a comprehensive and reliable confession, 
it is usually impossible for the prosecution to get into the mind of the accused 
and to demonstrate exactly what it finds was there at the time of the criminal 
act’62.  McSherry makes the point in relation to Australian law (although it is 
equally applicable in New Zealand) that there are no fewer than three elements 
of intention each of which must be proved in relation to an offence of 
engaging in a terrorist act: ‘an intention to engage in the terrorist act; an 
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62  Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493 at 551. 
Small: Public Safety and Security 22 
intention to advance a political, religious or ideological cause; and an intention 
to intimidate specified groups’63.   
 
Besides this practical consideration, a more fundamental issue arises with the 
way in which new anti-terrorism legislation blurs the line that has hitherto 
been drawn in criminal law between intent and motive.  Lord Halisham 
identified a clear distinction between motive and intent, declaring that ‘it is the 
emotion that gives rise to an intention and it is the latter and not the former 
which converts an actus reus into a criminal act’64. 
 
McSherry argues that the new terrorism offences ‘do not fit comfortably 
within the traditional framework for serious crimes because they focus on why 
the conduct was performed and at whom it was aimed, rather than on what 
was done’65.  That is, the prosecution must prove the motive behind an act and 
not just the intention to commit the act itself.  She notes that motive is 
normally taken into consideration at the sentencing stage, rather than in 
determining whether to assign criminal responsibility.  Moreover, although 
one might agree with the reasoning behind UN Resolution 1624 that terrorist 
acts should be condemned ‘irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by 
whomever committed’, it does not follow that an act that is carried out with 
basic criminal motivation should be considered a less serious offence than the 
same act that is carried out with an ideological or religious motivation, 
however misguided that might be. 
 
The ideological component of terrorist acts also has a major impact on the 
legal system well before any prosecution.  The new terrorism offences orient 
the attention of police and intelligence agencies to gathering and analyzing 
data and forming opinions about certain political and cultural groups.  For 
decades, the culture if not the explicit policy within such agencies has been to 
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view with suspicion individuals and groups engaged in pressing for some form 
of social change66.     
 
Section 5(5) of the Terrorism Suppression Act provides an element of 
protection for ‘a person who engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent, or 
engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action’.  There remains, 
however, a concern that the additional powers and resources afforded to New 
Zealand police and intelligence agencies by new anti-terrorism legislation 
could be used to increase their surveillance of or other intrusions into the lives 
of those engaged in what should be their legitimate right to organise political 
campaigns and actions.  As W Young J noted ‘there is a difference between 
police maintaining an interest in political activists (which I accept is 
legitimate) and the police equating political activism with either the 
commission of criminal offences or with a sufficient propensity to commit 
criminal offences to justify the obtaining of search warrants when an offence 
has been committed’67. 
 
The combination of a political orientation and the point at which an inchoate 
offence has been committed under terrorism legislation was brought into sharp 
relief in New Zealand by the October 2007 raids.  The police issued 
statements about terrorist training camps that included instruction in the use of 
napalm and maintained that the raids were a legitimate response to an 
imminent threat to public safety.  Critics argued that any threats of this nature 
could be dealt with under the provisions of criminal law without recourse to 
the Terrorism Suppression Act.  The Solicitor-General ruled that the evidence 
the police had presented to him did not warrant laying anti-terrorism charges 
and described the act as unworkable.  Despite District Court suppression 
orders, two daily newspapers owned by Fairfax published excerpts of material 
that had been leaked to them and, as a consequence, faced prosecution for 
compromising the fair trial rights of the accused.  Although this charge was 
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not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment notes that the actions of 
Fairfax in publishing the intercepted communications were unlawful and were 
not ‘in the best interests of responsible and fearless journalism’.  The 
judgment also noted: 
 
‘It may be necessary in future cases to consider whether contempt may 
be established where a publication has a general tendency to interfere 
with the administration of justice even where it cannot be 
demonstrated that the publication has compromised fair trial rights in a 
particular case.’68 
 
There is a degree of public scepticism of the competence and political bias of 
New Zealand’s intelligence agencies which is derived from the perception of 
their actions in relation to previous incidents.  Important among these was the 
break-in by the NZSIS to the home of an opponent of neoliberalism at the time 
of an APEC Trade Ministers’ meeting in 1996.  The break-in occurred less 
than two weeks after the passage of the first amendment to the NZSIS Act 
since the end of the Cold War.  One of the changes to the Act was to broaden 
the scope of the service to concern itself with not just traditional concepts of 
terrorism and subversion, but also activities that ‘impact adversely on New 
Zealand's international well-being or economic well-being’69.  
 
Critics of the legislation argued that this gave the service licence to spy on 
political activists such as opponents of the neoliberal restructuring of New 
Zealand that had been pursued since 1984.  Such concerns were dismissed and 
the public was assured that the amendments were to make it possible for the 
SIS to defend the country against modern threats such as industrial and 
economic sabotage.  Assurances were also given that, with the simultaneous 
creation of the office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, any 
citizens who feared that they were being unfairly or illegitimately harmed by 
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the service could avail themselves of a new and independent avenue of appeal.  
The Inspector-General was to be appointed from the ranks of retired High 
Court judges and would enjoy the same status as a High Court judge with 
extensive powers of investigation of all NZSIS documents and personnel70. 
 
The victim of the 1996 break-in, Aziz Choudry, as well as the person who 
caught the agents, each laid complaints with the Inspector-General with 
respect to the break-in and subsequent police search for bomb-making 
equipment.  The Inspector-General conducted a joint investigation of the 
complaints and concluded (without confirming or denying that the perpetrators 
of the break-in were SIS agents) that ‘no law (had) been broken’.  Subsequent 
private legal action against the SIS for trespass and the Police for a breach of 
section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 1990 were both 
successful. 
 
Thus, the Inspector-General failed to provide the guarantees of appeal against 
the actions of an intelligence agency for which the office was established.  It 
could be argued that this failure represented a significant consequence of 
oversight being conducted in isolation from the important sets of checks and 
balances such as disclosure, cross-examination and appeal that are an essential 
part of the normal judicial process.  It also demonstrated the need for citizens 
to retain the ability to pursue independent avenues of appeal through the 
courts, even in matters of national security.  There is, however, a tendency on 
the part of those promoting anti-terrorist legislation to remove mechanisms of 
judicial oversight through the insertion of privative clauses within that 
legislation.   
 
These issues were brought to the fore in the case of Ahmed Zaoui, an elected 
MP in Algeria who was amongst those ousted by the Algerian military and 
who arrived in New Zealand in 2002 seeking refugee status.  The following 
year, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority agreed that he met the high 
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threshold required for obtaining refugee status in New Zealand.  However, 
upon his arrival in the country, the NZSIS had issued him with a risk security 
certificate under the provisions of the Immigration Act.  While claiming that 
Zaoui’s presence in New Zealand posed an unacceptable risk to national 
security, the service refused to release to Zaoui or his lawyers any of the 
information they were relying on in making that assessment.  Neither would 
they disclose the source of that intelligence.  Zaoui’s avenue of appeal against 
the service was through the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.  
He was, therefore, expected to reply to accusations about him the content of 
which was not known to him, and in doing so to rely on the offices of the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security that had previously been found 
wanting. 
 
Zaoui sought to challenge preliminary decisions by the Inspector-General in 
relation his rights under the principles of natural justice enshrined in 
NZBORA to access information about himself.  The Crown objected relying 
in part on Section 19(9) of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
Act that ‘except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, no proceeding, report or 
finding of the Inspector-General shall be challenged, reviewed, quashed or 
called in question in any Court’.  In a piece of close judicial reasoning, the 
Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s argument that it had no judicial 
oversight of decisions of the Inspector-General.  Citing the case of Bulk Gas 
Users Group71 in which the court had found a way around a purported 
privative clause in legislation, Young J argued that, since the clause in the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act was similar to that used in 
the legislation under scrutiny in the Bulk Gas case and had been drafted 
subsequent to that judgment, Parliament must have intended that judicial 
oversight was not totally excluded72. 
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A similar display of judicial activism can be seen in the Belmarsh case where, 
in contrast to the approach taken in Lewes, the House of Lords accepted that a 
‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ existed but refused to 
defer to the executive in assessing the proportionality of measures taken under 
the cloak of national security73.  By contrast, the Thomas case74 in Australia 
reveals a far more deferential approach by the judiciary on matters of national 
security75. 
 
 
5 National Security and the Law 
 
There are two broad ways of responding to the uneasy relationship that has 
been identified between new anti-terrorism measures and basic legal 
principles.  One is that this provides good reason for rewriting the legislation 
to ensure that it is consistent with the rule of law and enables criminal law to 
deal as effectively as possible with the new challenges presented by current 
forms of terrorism.  The other is the argument that criminal law is incapable of 
dealing with the challenge of terrorism; that it is ‘fundamentally inadequate as 
a complete response to our present predicament’76.  This latter view is the one 
advanced by Ackerman who, while declaring the need to ‘prevent politicians 
from exploiting momentary panic to impose long-lasting limitations on 
liberty77’ advances a case for ‘replac(ing) the logic of war with the logic of a 
temporary state of emergency’78. 
 
Although he is a critic of the ‘war on terror’ model of dealing with political 
violence, Ackerman shares the views of the ‘war on terror’ proponents about 
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the extreme nature of the threat posed by terrorism.  The scenario he presents 
is an attack far more deadly than September 11, which ‘was merely a pinprick 
compared to the devastation of a suitcase A-bomb or an anthrax epidemic’79.  
In such circumstances, he argues, sweeping executive powers would be 
required for a limited time to introduce draconian measures that consciously 
undermine established rights and freedoms as well as the checks and balances 
of the legal process.  What would set such a scenario apart from other attacks 
is, he argues, its direct targeting of effective sovereignty. 
 
‘It is wrong … for legal traditionalists to treat the war on terror as if it 
were merely a symptom of collective paranoia, which Americans will 
come to regret as they recover their sobriety.  War talk makes a 
fundamental point that the legal tradition fails squarely to confront: the 
criminal law treats individual cases as if the larger question of effective 
sovereignty has already been resolved.  But terrorist attacks represent a 
public assault on this premise, and the visible affront to effective 
sovereignty will be exploited again and again by the terror warriors to 
aggrandize their power’80. 
 
Critics question whether the challenge posed by terrorism is really as 
unprecedented as Ackerman maintains.  Bonner says this claim would ‘raise 
eyebrows among those who lived through or were victims of the IRA’s 
bombing campaign in Northern Ireland and on mainland Great Britain from 
1969 to 1999’ as well as those ‘who lived through the nuclear threat during the 
Cold War’81.  Ackerman insists that the Communist threat during the Cold 
War ‘remained abstract to ordinary people and the government’s effective 
sovereignty was never seriously questioned’82.  However, Gearty points out 
that the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the anti-sedition 
Smith Act ‘precisely on account of the terrible transformative consequences of 
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Communist success, a set of outcomes which were so bad that they justified 
the restrictions of free speech to be found in the Act, even though the chances 
of such a revolution were slight’83.  Gearty also notes that Ackerman does not 
explain why the criminal law cannot cope with the challenge of a cataclysmic 
terrorist attack, even if it does represent an assault on the effective sovereignty 
of the state84. 
 
Others, while not going as far as Ackerman, also advocate a response to 
terrorism that sits outside the criminal law.  Cohen, for example, argues that ‘a 
bright line be maintained between national security intelligence gathering 
activities and ordinary criminal investigation’.  This is based on the view that 
what he sees to be the imperatives of intrusive national security powers should 
be kept quarantined from the normal legal process process.  He warns that 
without it, ‘our ability to protect the ordinary criminal justice system from the 
tainting effects of activities or techniques used in the national security sphere 
will be compromised’85.   
 
Kennedy discounts the possibility of such a bright line being effective.  She 
describes the anti-terrorist laws as ‘a contagion which seeps into the 
bloodstream of the legal and political system’86.  She argues that such 
legislation has been shown to ‘play havoc with the mindset of police officers 
and people working in the legal system, even lawyers and judges’.  Drawing 
on the UK experience, she points out that the high number of miscarriages of 
justice that took place in the 1970s and early 80s, especially in the West 
Midlands87, were not all related to subversion, but were handled by the 
branches of the police that dealt with the bulk of the terrorism cases and had 
developed a culture that ‘fostered a particular kind of policing’88.  This is 
consistent with the warning of Cole and Lobel that, once the clarity of certain 
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prohibitions is lifted, ‘officials will be likely to interpret “emergency 
situations” broadly and emergency powers will be increasingly used in 
nonemergency situations’89. 
 
New Zealand’s anti-terrorist legislation has received international praise for 
the balance it achieves between ensuring national security and protecting 
individual freedoms.  ‘Comparing New Zealand to similar systems around the 
world’, wrote Smith in 2003, ‘this country has adopted an anti-terrorism 
regime that effectively balances international demands, national needs, and 
individual rights’90.  In October 2007, a report of the Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative declared that New Zealand’s ‘anti-terrorism legislation has 
been enacted without a consequent reduction in human rights in part because 
many concerns of civil and human rights groups, in submissions to 
Parliament, were incorporated in the redrafting of the final acts’91.  Ironically, 
the publication of the report coincided with not only the pre-dawn anti-
terrorism raids but also the passage through parliament of amendments to the 
Terrorism Suppression Act that tilted the balance further towards the security 
end of the security/freedom continuum. 
 
New Zealand anti-terrorism law has not adopted provision for detention 
without charge or compromised the right to silence as has been the case in 
other jurisdictions.  And the Terrorism Suppression Act does include some 
provisions for judicial review92.  However, it is being incrementally tightened 
largely as a result of pressure to become more compliant with UN anti-
terrorism resolutions93.  Among the recent changes, for example, the 
requirement that the financing of a designated terrorist entity would be an 
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offence only if it was done with the purpose of assisting that entity to carry out 
a terrorist act was removed.  In other words, the financing of health, education 
or other social or humanitarian programmes run by broad spectrum groups in 
places like Aceh, Sri Lanka or Palestine could be terrorist offences.  New 
Zealanders have a long history of supporting such groups, notably the 
Southern African liberation movements during the Apartheid era.  The 
Terrorism Suppression Act, like the Australian legislation before it, may now 
deny New Zealanders ‘the right to politically associate with any political 
movements which may be involved in violent struggles anywhere in the 
world’94. 
 
Agencies such as the NZSIS, while charged with defending New Zealand’s 
national security, have long considered themselves beholden to a higher order 
of authority.  With their privileged access to information that the rest of the 
citizenry cannot share, they act as the people’s proxy.  The line of 
accountability back to the people is by way of Prime Ministerial oversight of 
their activities.  However, the Security Intelligence Service of New Zealand is 
a long way down the global hierarchy of intelligence organizations.  It is 
essentially a consumer of intelligence and, being reliant on other agencies, is 
required to conform to their norms95.   
 
 
6 Getting the Balance Right? 
 
The task that the New Zealand Law Commission was set in the wake of the 
October 2007 raids was essentially that of balancing national security and 
individual freedoms and human rights.  The Australian Attorney-General, 
Philip Ruddock, described the current global context as ‘a world of trade-
offs’: 
                                                
94   A. Ricketts, ‘Freedom of Association or Guilt by Association: Australia’s New Anti-Terrorism 
Laws and the Retreat of Political Liberty, Southern Cross University Law Review. Volume 6, 2002, 
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‘And now we live in a world where we must accept the costs 
associated with protecting ourselves form terrorism..  There will 
always be a trade-off between national security and individual rights. 
The task of government is to recognize these trade-offs and preserve 
out security without compromising basic rights and liberties’96. 
 
The issue was couched in similar terms by the Sheller Committee in its 2006 
review of Australia’s new anti-terrorism legislation and by the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s review of sedition laws that spoke of ‘balancing anti-
terrorism measures with human rights’97. 
 
Hocking makes the point that striking the wrong balance between national 
security and personal freedoms may even be counter-productive in that those 
most readily identified as ‘terrorist candidates’, that is, those who would be 
most likely to be the subjects of the extra powers of the police, might become 
so alienated and marginalised that they may in turn become sympathetic or 
even potential recruits to the terrorists’ cause98. 
  
Others, however, go further by calling into question the whole ‘balancing’ 
approach that underlies much scholarly writing and public discourse 
associated with combating terrorism.  Bronitt99 and Michaelsen100 and 
challenge the notion that civil liberties can or should be balanced against 
national security; that in order to save liberal democracy from the threat posed 
                                                
96  P. Ruddock. ‘The Commonwealth Response to September 11: The Rule of Law and National 
Security’ 10 November 2003. 
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100 C. Michaelsen. ‘Balancing Civil Liberties against National Security? A Critique of Counterterrorism 
Rhetoric’, University of New South Wales Law Journal. Volume 29, number 2, 2006. 
Small: Public Safety and Security 33 
to it by international terrorism, we must strike a balance between security and  
liberty.   
 
Michaelsen’s argument is that ‘the assertion that civil liberties need to be 
balanced against the interests of national security is, at best, misleading and, at 
worst, structurally wrong’101.  He mounts a series of inter-related reasons to 
support this view and proposes a helpful alternative to the balancing approach.  
Michaelsen’s philosophical objection is based on a rejection of the notion that 
a citizen is able to enjoy civil liberties only in the context of a secure 
environment which cannot be achieved without expanding the powers of the 
state through anti-terrorism legislation. Ruddock made the point in precisely 
those terms when he declared that, in light of the new climate of terrorism ‘we 
must recognize that national security can in fact promote civil liberties by 
preserving a society in which rights and freedoms can be exercised’ and that 
‘the extent to which we can enjoy our civil liberties rests upon the 
effectiveness of our anti-terrorism laws’102.   
 
Michaelsen argues that framing national security as a precondition of liberty 
sits uneasily with the fundamental liberal notions of consent and legitimacy as 
it tends to ‘ignore the fact that individual freedom legitimises the existence of 
the state in the first place’103.  He quotes a former German Justice Minister, 
Burkhard Hirsch, who said, ‘there is no societal freedom without the freedom 
of the individual’.  Michaelsen notes that the duty to protect citizens from 
physical harm is just one of a number of interrelated and indivisible 
obligations of government that include ensuring that ‘individuals are not 
subjected to oppressive state action’, and he argues that ‘a policy that does not 
respect human rights in the first place cannot legitimately claim to protect 
these rights against transnational security threats in times of emergency’104.  
The dangers of treating security as paramount have also been highlighted by 
                                                
101, Ibid.,p.3. 
102  P. Ruddock. ‘A New Framework: Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law’, The Sydney Papers. 
Volume 16, number 2, 2004. 
103  Michaelsen. Op. cit., p.5. 
104  Ibid., p.6. 
Small: Public Safety and Security 34 
the International Commission of Jurists, which noted in the Berlin 
Declaration: 
 
‘A pervasive security-oriented discourse promotes the sacrifice of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the name of eradicating 
terrorism… [S]afeguarding persons form terrorist acts and respecting 
human rights both form part of a seamless web of protection 
incumbent upon the state’105. 
 
A second objection to the balancing approach is based on a critique of the 
view advanced by Ruddock and his German counterpart, Otto Schily, who 
treat a ‘basic right to security’ as a key component of the inalienable human 
rights that every individual should enjoy.  Michaelsen notes that the advocates 
of this view seek to ground their argument with reference to Article 3 of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 9 
of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which 
refers to ‘the right to liberty and security of person’.  This is a crucial point as 
it seeks to establish, as the trade-off model must if it is to be sustainable, that 
the elements that are to be traded off are of comparable importance.   
 
Decades before terrorist acts were unequivocally condemned by being 
declared unacceptable in any circumstances, human rights were agreed to be 
unequivocally essential in that no circumstance could justify their being 
compromised.  However, it does not follow from a categorical condemnation 
of all terrorist acts that it should be permissible for strategies to prevent such 
attacks to compromise basic rights.  Furthermore, as Michaelsen notes, far 
from being an obligation on the state to protect the physical integrity of its 
citizens, the ‘right to liberty and security of person’ that is referred to in the 
                                                
105  The Berlin Declaration: The International Commission of Jurists Declaration on Upholding 
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ICCPR is designed as a means of ‘confining the power of the state to coerce 
individuals through arbitrary arrest and detention’106.  
 
Such a depiction of security policy as an integral dimension of a commitment 
to upholding basic human rights conceals the fact that, as Michaelsen puts it, 
‘it is a defining characteristic of liberal democracy that security policy is 
normatively bound to the rule of law and to human rights; it is not an end in 
itself’107. 
 
A third, and more practical objection to the balancing approach relates to how 
one might measure the balance in question.  While on one hand it is clear that 
liberties and human rights are being compromised and eroded in the name of 
the ‘war on terror’, the returns in terms of enhanced security are very difficult 
to demonstrate.  It is clear that at least some elements of the actions 
undertaken as part of the war on terror were based on the broadly felt need, 
particularly in the United States, that something needed to be done by way of 
reprisal even if it was a purely symbolic action.  Acknowledging that fair 
estimates of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures are notoriously 
difficult to make, Michaelsen says that this cannot be an excuse for a failure to 
conduct as thorough an analysis as is possible of such measures including, for 
example, the effectiveness (or, as Rojahn has argued108, the ineffectiveness) of 
repressive counter-measures and special anti-terrorism laws introduced to 
combat left-wing terrorism in Europe in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
Roach makes the point that, while the criminal sanctions of the anti-terrorism 
legislation may act as a deterrent to third parties who might otherwise offer 
assistance to terrorists, the deterrent effect on the terrorists themselves is 
highly questionable109.  This is particularly apposite at a time when so much 
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terrorist activity is carried out by suicide bombers.  Waldron shares this view 
and poses the question of whether, even if they do succeed in increasing the 
likelihood of convicting and punishing terrorists, compromises to due process 
do enhance security.  Without a deterrent effect, he argues, it is possible that 
such legal ‘victories’ could make it ‘more rather than less likely that the 
country punishing the suspect is subject to terrorist attack’.  Therefore, he 
argues, the reasons for punishing the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not 
ones of security but of justice ‘and those reasons of justice may not be as 
separate from the scheme of civil liberties that we are currently trading off as 
the “new balance” image might suggest’110.  What is required but has been 
lacking to date, insists Michaelsen, is ‘a detailed enquiry into whether a 
diminution of liberty actually enhances security or whether one is trading off 
civil liberties for symbolic gains and psychological comfort’111. 
 
Bronitt describes as ‘irresistible’ the pressure politicians feel to offer 
reassurance to the electorate in the wake of a terrorist attack and argues that, in 
hastily borrowing legislation from other jurisdictions, Australia sought to 
develop an anti-terrorism framework on the cheap without seriously 
considering its effectiveness or whether minor adaptations could achieve a 
result ‘more consistent with the existing fabric of our criminal laws’112.  
O’Cinneide makes the related point that in times of public panic, proper 
parliamentary consideration of legislation is undermined by the tendency for 
opposition to hard-line measures to evaporate in the face of the electorate’s 
expectations of action.  This dynamic limits the capacity of the legislature to 
prevent the cycle of terror, panic and repression which, he argues, has been a 
repeating characteristic of British law since the Fenian bombings of the 
1860s113. 
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As an alternative to the balancing approach, Michaelsen favours the 
‘proportionality test’ that has been developed in Germany and refined by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court114.  This model identifies three main 
requirements that must be met if there is to be any curtailment of 
constitutionally protected civil liberties or human rights.  Any such measures 
should be ‘suitable’ or likely to achieve their intended purpose, ‘necessary’ or 
warranted by the exigencies of the situation and unable to be achieved by less 
drastic measures, and ‘appropriate’ or not disproportionate to the purpose of 
the measure and not, for example, affecting the very nature of the right or 
freedom that is being curtailed.  Clearly, Michaelsen argues, ‘the more the 
statutory infringement affects fundamental expressions of human freedom of 
action, the more carefully the reasons serving as its justification must be 
examined against the principal claim to liberty of the citizen’115. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Kennedy writes: 
 
‘Just law is the invisible substance which sustains social well-being, 
moral consensus, mutuality of interest and trust.  If we interfere with 
the principles which underpin law, fritter them away, pick them out of 
the crannies of our political and social architecture, restoration is 
impossible.  Our only hope is an order governed by law and 
consent’116. 
 
The task that the New Zealand Law Commission has been set is a similar 
challenge to that facing other countries around the world.  The contemporary 
threat of terrorism is testing the capacity of liberal democracies to maintain 
their security whilst upholding basic freedoms and the rule of law.  However, 
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there is also a sense in which this provides a unique and valuable opportunity 
both for New Zealand itself and for the international community.  Seven years 
after the September 11 attacks, there is a wealth of theoretical and empirical 
material to review, particularly if the terms of reference are interpreted less as 
a balancing exercise than as a proportionality test.  It would be more possible 
now than seven years ago, for example, to assess the actual effectiveness of 
anti-terrorism measures.  Similarly, more informed judgments are now able to 
be made as to whether it really is impossible to combat terrorism within the 
confines and established principles of criminal law. 
 
The Law Commission is ideally placed to conduct a thorough review of all of 
New Zealand’s anti-terrorist legislation in itself and in its application.  This 
article, through its discussions of the failure of the Inspector-General to 
recognise that the law had been broken in relation to the APEC case as well as 
the conflict between Section 12 of the Terrorism Suppression Act and the 
nulla poena principle, has revealed examples of possible conflicts between the 
pursuit of national security and adherence to important legal methods and 
principles.  Reference has been made to three particular examples; the APEC 
incident, the Zaoui cases and the October 2007 anti-terrorism raids.  Each of 
these is highly instructive, raising a wide range of fundamental issues 
including the separation of powers, public accountability, the right to political 
dissent, the politics of policing, and freedom of the press.  These examples 
could also be examined to assess the effectiveness of safeguards such as the 
NZBORA which, despite being introduced in an earlier, less digitised and less 
intrusive era, still contains the weakening provision of Section 4(b). 
 
With some distance from the horror of the September 11 attacks, and 
nothwithstanding the Bali, Madrid, London, Mumbai and other terrorist 
atrocities in the interim, the Law Commission is also in a position to use as 
one of its starting points an assessment of the actual risk that terrorism poses 
to New Zealand.  This would enable it to assess, for example, what differences 
there may be between an anti-terrorism strategy that is oriented to address the 
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risk to New Zealand as compared with one that has been designed for 
countries with a far greater likelihood of being a terrorist target.  It could, for 
example, propose a comparable approach to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear 
stance with a political and legislative framework that is designed to meet New 
Zealand’s own specific needs and mitigate the actual threats that it faces.  In 
doing so, the Law Commission might consider a range of ways for New 
Zealand to fulfil its obligations as a global citizen, one of which might be to 
develop an anti-terrorism model that could be adopted by other low-risk 
countries, including its Pacific neighbours whom it has already pledged to 
support. 
 
In conducting its review, the Law Commission also has the benefit of being 
able to draw on a vast body of excellent legal scholarship, only a small part of 
which has been able to be included within the scope of this article.  With its 
legal expertise and without the politicians’ vulnerability to political polls, the 
Law Commission is ideally placed to conduct this review.  By being able to 
identify what legal principles are at stake and why they are important, the Law 
Commission should be able to ensure that, if Parliament does ultimately 
decide to continue to compromise and/or further compromise any basic 
freedoms of New Zealanders in the name of national security, it at least does 
so deliberately and explicitly and can be judged by the public accordingly.  In 
this regard, however, if the people of New Zealand are able to make a 
meaningful judgment, to give their informed consent, there may be a need for 
a process of public consultation and education for them to fully appreciate and 
comment on what is at issue.  Such a process would be appropriate given the 
importance of the matters under consideration, and its engagement of the 
public would be in keeping with what international commentators have 
identified as one of the most positive aspects of New Zealand’s anti-terrorism 
approach to date. 
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